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ABSTRACT
The decision to become an organ donor involves considering both self-relevant
risks and the needs of others. This study applied prospect theory to examine how
message frames that focus on the possible survival or death of a potential organ transplant
recipient affect participants' willingness to become organ donors. Perceived personal risk
and ambivalence were examined as moderating variables. Results indicate that risk,
rather than ambivalence, played an instrumental role in participants' decisions to donate.
Although no main effects or interactions related to message frame emerged in initial
analyses, a supplemental analysis revealed a modest persuasive advantage for the lossframed message among low-risk participants. Additional analyses revealed that for lowrisk participants, perceived benefits of organ donation were higher for the loss frame than
the gain frame, whereas the opposite pattern was found for high-risk participants.
Findings suggest that decisions about organ donation may be associated with unique
responses to message frames.
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"My Loss is Your Gain": Examining the Role of Message Frame, Perceived Risk, and
Ambivalence in the Decision to Become an Organ Donor.
Chapter 1
Literature Review
Introduction
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)
proposes that messages can be framed in terms of losses that will result if a given action
is not taken or gains that will result if the action is taken. The theory states that these
frames can have dramatically different influences on decision making. Depending on
whether they are presented with a gain or loss frame, the theory predicts that individuals
may be persuaded to engage in or avoid decisions and behaviors that could put either
themselves or others at risk. Prospect theory has frequently been used to make
predictions in different types of decision situations such as those that involve public
policies with far-reaching implications to groups of others, or even personal health
decisions that can have direct consequences for the decision maker. However, because
prospect theory has traditionally been applied to explain how individuals respond to
messages that emphasize either gains or losses to others or gains and losses to
themselves, its ability to explain decisions related to decisions that involve both the self
and others is limited. Specifically, it appears that the theory has not yet been applied to
explain prosocial or helping behaviors which involve a complex consideration of how a
given decision will affect both a benefactor and recipient.
A classic exemplar of prosocial behavior is posthumous organ donation. Because
it has the potential to save human lives, the act of becoming an organ donor is considered
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an ultimate act of generosity. Yet, it appears that relatively few individuals are willing to
be so generous. Currently, the waiting list for individuals awaiting transplants in the
United States tops over 96,000 candidates, yet the number of organ donors last year only
approached 15,000 (United Network for Organ Sharing, 2007). As the shortage of
available organs indicates, many individuals are less than willing to become donors,
despite the obvious benefit to transplant recipients. Research on organ donor behaviors
indicates that individuals' willingness to become donors may often have less to do with
their perception of potential benefits to organ recipients and more to do with their
concern about risks to themselves (e.g., Cacioppo & Gardner, 1993; Parisi & Katz, 1986;
van den Berg, Manstead, van der Plight, & Wigboldus, 2005). That is, individuals who
associate various risks with becoming a donor (e.g., having their body mutilated) may be
unwilling to register as a donor even if they believe that their donation could help save a
life. Rather than basing their decision about whether or not to become an organ donor
exclusively on the potential benefits to another, individuals appear to weigh these
benefits with the possible effects of their decision on themselves.
The circumstances surrounding organ donation present a unique opportunity to
explore the responses to messages that require individuals to weigh both the potential
gains and losses to themselves and the gains and losses to another individual. The
current paper will examine the relationship between self-relevant concerns and otherrelevant concerns by exploring the effects of self-perceived risk regarding organ donation
on how individuals respond to gain and loss framed messages about an individual in need
of a transplant. Additionally, in an attempt to help explain the influence of risk
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perceptions and framing on donation decisions, the role of belief ambivalence will be
explored.
Altruism
Theories of prosocial behavior shed light on why individuals may consent to
becoming organ donors even though their commitment almost exclusively benefits
recipients. In fact, both egoistic and altruistic explanations of prosocial behaviors may
shed some light on the different motivations individuals have for becoming organ donors.
Morgan and Miller (2002) argued that "organ donors have little if anything to gain
by donating their organs after deaths; it is a purely altruistic act, based on empathy with
those who are sick and in need of a transplant" (p.165). This rationale is closely aligned
with Batson's empathy-altruism hypothesis (EAH) (1987). According to this model,
altruism is a product of understanding a person's suffering and experiencing empathetic
concern for another. In various applications of the hypothesis, researchers have
demonstrated that altruism may be a direct product of concern for another instead of a
desire to alleviate personal undesirable feelings including guilt and shame (Batson et al.,
1991; Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986). Thus, according to the
EAH, prosocial behaviors occur in the absence of selfish incentives as a product of pure
altruism.
Alternatively, proponents of egoism argue that helping behavior is always
motivated by a benefit to the self. One of the most popular egoistic approaches is
Cialdini, Darby, and Vincent's (1973) Negative State Relief Model (NSRM), which
proposes that individuals regularly seek to alleviate their negative moods through
behaviors that will promote more positive mood states. Because empathetic distress is
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often caused as a result of learning about a person's suffering, the NSRM predicts that
individuals will engage in behaviors that help the victim in order to relieve their own
personal feelings of distress by eliminating the source of the negative affect or gaining
social approval. Even individuals experiencing positive affect may wish to further
improve their mood by engaging in helping behavior (Yinon & Landau, 1987). Thus,
ultimately, the NSRM provides an explanation for seemingly altruistic behaviors that
benefit recipients but are ultimately self-seeking because they are motivated by the desire
to feel like a benevolent person.
Although the EAH and the NSRM provide different explanations for reasons that
individuals may be motivated to engage in prosocial helping behaviors, both may be used
to explain decisions to commit to organ donation. According to the EAH, helping
behavior is prompted by a concern for others. Hence, participation as a posthumous organ
donor may be a product of sincere concern for health and safety of individuals in dire
need of a transplant. In contrast, the NSRM argues that individuals are motivated to
prosocial action by a concern for themselves. Thus, an organ donation commitment
could also be a result of individuals' desire to enhance good feelings related to positive
self-evaluations or avoid negative feelings that could result from not becoming a donor.
For example, individuals may be motivated to become a donor to avoid or alleviate
feelings of guilt that could result from not helping potential transplant recipients (MassiLindsey, 2005). Taken together, both the EAH and the NSRM are useful to the study of
organ donation behaviors because they describe a process of prosocial behavior that
could be inspired by both self-relevant concerns and concerns for others.
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However, although these explanations provide a useful framework for describing
the personal incentives for becoming a donor that include both self and other
considerations, no research could be located that explores the influence of these
incentives on organ donation message evaluation. Furthermore, while the EAH and
NSRM each identify different reasons why individuals may be inspired to become an
organ donor because of self and other benefits associated with the process, these models
do not address the influence of perceived risks to the self that could conflict with
individuals' positive feelings about the process. The following section addresses how
different message frames may interact with individuals' perception of benefits for both
self and others to moderate commitments to organ donation.
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)
categorizes message frames according to whether they predominantly emphasize a loss or
a gain. This theory proposes that even when a gain frame and loss frame present the
same objective information about a particular risk, loss frames encourage individuals to
adopt risk-seeking behavior while gain frames cause individuals to become risk-aversive.
According to the theory, individuals tend to be loss-sensitive. Thus, when offered a
prospect of avoiding a loss, individuals will take it even if their decision runs the risk of
resulting in a greater loss. Likewise, because individuals want to avoid the loss of
preexisting gains, prospects that allow them to retain them (i.e., gain frames) will
encourage people to engage in less risky decision making, even if they forfeit the
possibility of greater gains. The tenets of prospect theory have yielded consistent
predictions for several different decisions and actions such as the behavior of financial
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investors and consumers, foreign policy decisions, and public opinion on war (Boettcher,
1995; Levi & Whyte, 1997; Puto, 1987; Shefrin & Meir, 2003).
In a well-known application of prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1984, p.
343) asked participants to decide between different treatment programs for an epidemic
expected to kill 600 individuals. First, participants were given the choice between a
program option framed in terms of the lives that will certainly be saved (i.e., "If program
A is adopted, 200 people will be saved") or a program option framed with less certainty
that lives will be saved (i.e., "if program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that
600 people will be saved, and two-thirds probability that no people will be saved"). In
this case participants preferred the certain-gain program option, even though there was a
possibility of saving more lives with the alternative option. However, when Kahneman
and Tversky framed the treatment options in terms of lives lost (i.e., "If program C is
adopted, 400 people will die. If program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability
that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die"), participants
overwhelmingly preferred the program option that risked further deaths to the option that
resulted in a certain-loss of lives. Thus, even though the gain and loss frames presented
identical treatment options (i.e., both offered the possibility of preserving 200 and losing
400 lives vs. the uncertain probabilities associated with either saving or losing all 600
lives), participants made different decisions according to whether the information was
framed in terms of lives saved or lives lost. Consistent with the predictions of prospect
theory, these responses illustrate that gain frames encourage individuals to avoid taking
risks, while loss frames promote risk-seeking behaviors.
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Prospect theory has also been successfully applied in the realm of health
communication to explain reactions to personal health recommendations. In the context
of health messages, prospect theory proposes that health behavior actions or
modifications can be framed either in terms of the consequential benefits or the
repercussions of adopting or not adopting the recommended behavior. For example, a
message designed to encourage smoking cessation could either emphasize the
improvements in health (gain) that could result if the recommendation is adopted or the
risk of cancer (loss) that could result if the recommendation is not adopted. However, in
their review of prospect theory's application to health messages, Rothman and Salovey
(1997) found that the relative effectiveness of a gain or loss frame at promoting a
particular health behavior depends on whether the behavior involves health screening or
health prevention. Health screening behaviors are those that individuals engage in as a
way of detecting a preexisting ailment (e.g., a mammogram). A certain degree of risk is
associated with these behaviors because the possibility exists that an illness will be
revealed. Health prevention behaviors are those that are done to maintain or improve
personal health (e.g., wearing sunscreen). These behaviors tend to be health-affirming
and relatively free of risk because, from the individual's perspective, they can only offer
an improvement to their current situation. Rothman and Salovey conclude that the degree
of perceived risk involved with a particular behavior will ultimately determine which
type of frame is the most effective impetus for behavior. Specifically, they argue that
loss frames tend to be more effective at encouraging individuals to engage in risk-laden
screening-related behaviors while gain framed messages provide stronger motivation for
less risky prevention behaviors.

8

Rothman and Salovey's (1997) extension of the prospect theory to health outcome
framing has explained responses to a variety of prevention and screening messages. For
example, gain-framed messages highlighting the benefits of sunscreen have been found to
be more effective at promoting sunscreen use than those emphasizing the dangers
associated with not using sunscreen (Detweiler et al., 1999). The same results have been
found for messages promoting preventative behaviors such as exercising, wearing
condoms, and proper use of infant car seats (Linville, Fischer, & Fischhoff, 1993;
Robberson & Rogers, 1988; Treiber, 1986). However, when it comes to encouraging
individuals to engage in a screening behavior that could potentially detect an illness such
as a mammogram, loss framed messages that emphasize the risks of leaving an illness
undetected are more effective than those focusing on the benefits of the screening (Banks,
Salovey, Greener, & Rothman, 1995). Loss frames have also been shown to be
particularly effective at encouraging detection behaviors such as HIV screenings,
testicular self-exams, blood-cholesterol screenings, and skin cancer self-exams
(Apanovitch, McCarthy, & Salovey, 2003; Block & Keller, 1995; Maheswaran &
Meyers-Levy, 1990; Umphrey, 2003).
Whether applied to public health decisions or personal health behaviors, the
success of gain and loss framing seems to depend on where the risk is directed. Just as
individuals are motivated to make risk-laden decisions on behalf of an unknown group
when presented with the possibility of grave losses, they are also more willing to engage
in screening behaviors if they believe that not doing so would result in a significant
personal loss. In contrast, the prospect of gains encourages individuals to make
conservative decisions when it comes to the fate of unknown groups (such as the
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beneficiaries of the treatment programs in Kahneman & Tversky's, 1983, scenarios) and
is also effective at encouraging prevention behaviors that involve relatively little risk.
Thus, to the extent that the risk presented in a loss frame is seen as significant,
individuals can be motivated to take a risk by either selecting a potentially beneficial
public policy that could nonetheless result in additional deaths to other people or by
engaging in an uncertain detection behavior that could potentially reveal an lifethreatening illness that poses a risk to the self.
The current study examines responses to loss and gain framed articles on
becoming a posthumous organ donor. Because it occurs following death, posthumous
organ donation is often discussed as a no-strings-attached option for donors. However,
past research has shown that many individuals suspect there are several personal risks
associated with becoming a posthumous organ donor, including bodily mutilation, fear of
receiving inadequate medical care or being put to death prematurely, creating family
conflict, and in some cases even violating religious doctrine (Parisi & Katz, 1986). Thus,
much like the screening behaviors discussed by Rothman and Salovey (1997), becoming
an organ donor can be considered a behavioral choice that involves some risk for the
donor.
Of course, organ transplant candidates face the risk of dying while waiting for a
donor. In this study, two versions of an article designed to promote organ donation were
created and focus on a college student who is expected to die if he does not receive a
double lung transplant. Recent research on living organ donation has found that
individuals may be more willing to commit to donation if they perceive there to be an
urgent need for organs (Popp et al., 2006), and willingness to become a posthumous
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organ donor may also be related to whether or not there seems to be a desperate need for
organs. The loss framed message highlights the severity of the situation by focusing on
the likelihood of a student's death should the shortage of donated organs prevent him
from a pair of donated lungs, while the gain framed article instead focuses on the benefits
of organ donation by discussing the likelihood of the student's survival in the event that
he receives the transplant. Because becoming an organ donor entails risk and highlights
the grim circumstances of the recipient, it should be more convincing than the gain frame.
In line with the predictions of prospect theory, which posits that frames emphasizing loss
cause individuals to become risk-seeking while those emphasizing gains cause
individuals to become risk-aversive, the loss frame should provide more incentive for
individuals to take a risk by becoming an organ donor (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Based on this conclusion, the following hypothesis was
proposed.
H1:

Participants exposed to the loss frame will be more willing to become an organ

donor that those exposed to the gain frame.
Self-Relevant Perceptions of Risk and Other-Relevant Perceptions of Need
Notably absent from the literature that explores responses to gain and loss frames
is a description of how individuals respond to messages about behavioral choices that
involve risks to the self and to others. As previously discussed, prospect theory has
typically been applied to explain responses to messages that emphasize personal risks to
the self (e.g., the consequences of not being screened for cancer) or risks that are relevant
to groups of others (e.g., the probability that groups will die of an epidemic if a treatment
option is not adopted). These studies collectively indicate that the degree of perceived
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risk to either the self or others can determine the effectiveness of a frame. However little
is known about the combined influence that self-relevant and other-relevant risks have on
framing responses.
In the current study, the sources of perceived risks to the self and perceived risks
to others differ. Whereas perceived risks to transplant candidates should be at least
partially a function of the message frame (i.e., the loss frame addressing the transplant
candidate's death should convey a higher level of need than the gain frame that focuses
on his survival), perceived risks to the self should be consistent with the participant's
preconceived notions about organ donation. In other words, the strength of participants'
perception of needs relevant to the potential organ recipients should differ primarily
based on the frame of the article they read, whereas the strength of their perception of
possible risks to themselves should vary according to the beliefs that were developed
prior to message exposure.
Presumably, self-relevant and other-relevant need perceptions compete with each
other for behavioral influence because they have conflicting goals; namely, preservation
of the self versus preservation of others. Whichever risk is perceived as being greater
should exert the most influence on decision making. In other words, individuals should
weigh the costs and benefits associated with both types of risk and make their decision
according to the one they deem to be the most salient (Dovido, 1984). When deciding
between an action that would put another at risk but keep themselves safe or an action
that would put themselves at risk but alleviate the risk of another, a person would likely
take the option that would provide a remedy for the greatest perceived risk. Thus, when
deciding to become an organ donor, individuals will have to consider both the danger to
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transplant candidates if they decide not to become a donor and any risks to themselves if
they do become a donor. Should individuals perceive the risks to themselves as donors as
higher than those to potential transplant recipients, they will be less likely to make a
commitment as an organ donor. On the other hand, if perceived self-risk is low enough,
their perception of danger facing recipients should influence them to become donors.
Hence, generally speaking, individuals with lower self-perceived risks associated with
organ donation should be more willing to become donors than those with higher selfperceived risks.
Moreover, because the decision of whether or not to become an organ donor is
based on the negotiation of preexisting self-relevant risks and other-relevant needs,
perceptions of risks that are at least partially frame induced, perceptions of risk to the self
should interact with article frame. The emphasis on the death of the prospective
transplant recipient in the loss framed article calls attention to danger facing the potential
transplant recipient. Therefore the loss framed article should require participants to give
greater consideration to other-relevant needs. Consequently, for individuals with high
self-relevant risk, the behavioral influence of the other-relevant risk in the loss frame
should pose a challenge to the behavioral influence of perceived risks to the self, creating
a greater conflict between self-risk and other-relevant needs. Thus, over all, the loss
frame should be effective to the extent that individuals view the risks to the prospective
organ recipient as being greater than their own personal risks associated with becoming a
donor.
Because the gain frame's discussion of saving a life still calls attention to the need
for organ donation, or rather, the risk to the recipient, the conflict between self-relevant
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risks and other-relevant needs should also be present for individuals exposed it.
Nonetheless, because this emphasis on the potential recipient's need is not strong as it is
in the loss frame, the gain frame is not expected to cause as much conflict with selfrelevant risks. Thus, the difference in effectiveness of the gain and loss frames for low
risk individuals would not be as great as the difference in effectiveness of the two frames
for high-risk individuals. In other words, the discrepancy in willingness to become an
organ donor for individuals exposed to the gain or loss frame will be greater for high risk
individuals than for low risk individuals. Based on this aforementioned rationale, the
following hypotheses were proposed:
H2: Low self-risk individuals will be more likely than high self-risk individuals to
become organ donors.
H3: Level of self-relevant risk and message frame will interact such that the relative
effectiveness of the loss frame over the gain frame will be greater for high-risk
individuals than for low-risk individuals.

Predicted Frame x Risk Interaction
High Risk
Low Risk

Gain Frame

Loss Frame

Figure 1
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The Benefits of Becoming an Organ Donor
In addition to the concerns regarding risks, the consideration of potential benefits
associated with becoming an organ donation should also have an effect on the responses
to both loss and gain framed messages. As both the EAH and the NSRM demonstrate,
prosocial behavior can be strongly influenced by perceptions of benefits to the self and to
the other. While perceived self-risks of organ donation tend to involve physical concerns
related to bodily harm or inadequate medical care, self-relevant benefits are more closely
aligned with having positive self evaluations. In line with the propositions of esteem
enhancement theory (see Batson, 1998), the benefits of becoming an organ donor could
involve having a very positive self-image or acquiring social approval. Yet, like
perceptions of personal risks, perceptions of personal benefits tend to have a source
external to most messages on organ donation. Although messages promoting organ
donation could conceivably appeal to these potential benefits, it seems like an uncommon
strategy. Rather, it seems likely that individuals should develop their perception of
personal benefits related to organ donation by considering their own positive emotions,
self-perception, and even social approval that would be associated with their decision to
become a donor.
Parisi and Katz (1986) documented several different types of benefits associated
with becoming an organ donor rooted in more altruistic attitudes. Besides, of course,
helping someone in need of an organ transplant, their study found that positive attitudes
towards becoming an organ donor were also related to other-relevant perceptions of
benefits to society at large (e.g., "organ donation benefits humanity"). Regarding self-
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relevant perceptions of benefits, participants also indicated that they recognized
becoming an organ donor may make them feel like a better person (e.g., "feel proud of
myself") and gain social approval (e.g., becoming an organ donor would make me
respected and admired by others"). Van den Berg et al. (2005) also found that
participants associate many positive feelings with organ donation such as pleasure and
gratification.
Ambivalence
On the surface, it would seem that the higher a person's perception of personal
benefits related to organ donation, the higher the likelihood that they will become an
organ donor. However, it is likely that persuasive influence of perceived self-relevant
benefits on a person's willingness to commit to organ donation will be inhibited by the
coactivated presence of perceived self-relevant risks. Thus, even if an individual expects
to have positive self-relevant emotions by becoming an organ donor, they may also be
cognitively sensitive to possible risks associated with the process. The following section
reviews theory and research that suggest, that, rather than being influenced by perceived
benefits (associated with self or others) or perceived risks alone, the decision to become
an organ donor (or not) is strongly affected by the cognitive ambivalence caused by
coexisting risks and benefits. Hence, ambivalence is predicted to explain the relationship
between self-relevant risks and benefits and responses to loss and gain framed messages
regarding organ donation.
Past research has already noted the apparently influential role of ambivalence in
decisions related to donor behaviors where attitudes and actual behaviors do not always
correspond. Cacioppo and Gardner (1993) reviewed Sarason et al.'s (1993) study of
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blood donation and concluded that "the positive and negative evaluative processes
underlying donor attitudes and behaviors are separable, and it is the negative substrate
that tends to be the impediment [of behavioral commitments to organ donation]" (p. 270).
In other words, beliefs and/or emotions about the potential risks to the self appear to
restrict the influence of even very strong positive attitudes on their decision to become a
donor. This ambivalence-created discrepancy between attitudes and behavior is a well
documented occurrence in attitude research (Ajzen, 2000; Armitage et al., 2002), and it
has been evidenced in much of the literature on organ donation.
As is the case with many personal health behaviors, individuals tend to hold
favorable views about the benefits of organ donation yet most do not register as organ
donors (Hessing & Elffers, 1986). Of course, ambivalence appears to be present in both
the belief and emotional components of attitudes. Much of the research on ambivalent
evaluations of organ donation has focused on beliefs about the donation process and
outcomes. For example, Parisi and Katz's (1986) found that participants with very
positive beliefs about their role in organ donation (e.g., "organ donation benefits the
whole of humanity") were the most willing to become organ donors, but this was only
true if their negative beliefs about their personal risks (e.g., "organ donation leaves the
body mutilated and disfigured") were weak. The authors concluded that the ambivalence
created from these conflicting strong positive beliefs and strong negative beliefs may
inhibit individuals' ability to make decisions and commit to becoming an organ donor.
Likewise, other studies have focused on the specific negative beliefs that tend to restrict
the influence of positive attitudes and/or beliefs. For example, research indicates that
individuals' willingness to become a blood or bone-marrow donor is inversely related to
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their perception of risks such as pain (Briggs, Piliavin, Lorentzen, & Becker, 1986;
Sarason et al., 1993). Finally, as previously referenced, a number of specific concerns,
such as body mutilation and receiving inadequate medical attention in a life-or-death
situation, have been shown to be factors that adversely impact individuals' willingness to
register as a posthumous organ donor (Parisi & Katz, 1986). Thus, despite positive
overall attitudes towards organ donation, any one or several of these types of negative
considerations may act to impede a person's decision to become an organ donor, even if
they have high levels of perceived benefits to the self and benefits to the other.
To help explain findings such as these, research has been steadily accumulating in
support of an independent conceptualization of a bivariate evaluation system that can
broadly accommodate mixed positive and negative environmental appraisals. Cacioppo
and Berntson (1994) developed the Evaluative Space Model (ESM) to broadly explain
the seperability of "general and enduring favorable or unfavorable feelings about,
evaluative categorizations of, and action predispositions toward stimuli" (p. 401). The
ESM proposes that there are actually separate—mostly distinct—systems for positive and
negative cognitive and affective evaluations, with distinct outcome options. Specifically,
the positive substrate is responsible for approach responses, while the negative substrate
is responsible for withdrawal responses. Because it conceptualizes positive and negative
evaluations as independent phenomena, this model allows for the possibility that they can
co-occur. However, the ESM proposes that these types of mixed positive and negative
evaluations result in conflict, they are uncomfortable, unstable, and unable to provide
clear behavioral direction. According to the model, the maximum amount of evaluative
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conflict occurs when both the positive and negative substrate are activated at high and
equal levels.
The propositions of the ESM reflect many of the findings obtained in past
research on the behavioral consequences of evaluative ambivalence. Ambivalence has
been defined as an evaluative state characterized by "equivalently high positive and
negative evaluations" (Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995, p. 367). The role of
ambivalence has often been applied to research on beliefs, judgments, and decisions
related to social prejudices and biases (e.g., Fiske & Glick, 1995). One finding from this
line of research is that individuals experiencing ambivalent attitudes may be more
motivated to scrutinize and pay closer attention to information regarding the judgments
and behaviors related to the source of ambivalence (Jonas, Diehl, & Bromer, 1997; Maio,
Bell, & Esses, 1996).
Furthermore, ambivalence could make individuals more susceptible to the
persuasive influence of additional information on the belief object. MacDonald and
Zanna (1998) compared the hypothetical hiring intentions of undergraduates who held
either ambivalent or unambivalent attitudes towards feminists. Before recommending
their hiring decision, participants were either primed with positive or negative
interpersonal qualities about three potential job applicants, one of whom was identified as
a feminist. This manipulation did not have any effect on unambivalent participants.
However those who held ambivalent attitudes about feminists tended to make their hiring
decision of a feminist applicant according to whether they were primed with the positive
or negative information. Because it appears that ambivalent individuals may be
dependent on external information to guide their decision, this finding provides partial
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support for the ESM's prediction that mixed evaluations provide unclear behavioral
guidance. Thus, it seems possible that evaluative inconsistencies may temporarily impair
behavior related decision-making; individuals could be highly motivated to process and
make behavioral decisions based on other information sources regarding the attitude
object.
In one of the only studies examining the role of ambivalence in responses to
positively and negatively framed health promotion messages, Broemer (2002) found that
a person's level of ambivalence affects their response to different message frames. In a
series of three experiments, he asked participants to indicate their experience of
ambivalence by rating their agreement with different statements regarding their
compliance with different prevention behaviors such as maintaining a low fat diet,
exercising, and using condoms (e.g., "Assuming I eat a low-fat diet in the future, I have
positive as well as negative feelings"). In two studies, participants were either exposed to
a message that emphasized the gains or losses associated with the prevention behavior.
Overall, Broemer argues that these studies revealed a negativity bias associated with
ambivalence. That is, individuals with the highest amount of preexisting ambivalence
were more persuaded by the loss frame to engage in the prevention behaviors, and
consistent with Rothman and Salovey's (1997) prediction regarding responses to
prevention behavior, individuals with low levels of ambivalence were more persuaded by
the gain frame. Of course, it is worth mention that the self-relevant risks that are posed
by exercising and eating a healthy diet are relatively low. These behaviors may be
uncomfortable, inconvenient, or expensive, but none of these consequences would seem
to involve the same level of risk that comes from the possibility of detecting a life-
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threatening illness or receiving inadequate medical attention as an organ donor. Thus, the
ambivalence that participants reported experiencing may be relatively low compared to
ambivalence that is elicited in response to behaviors that pose more significant risks to
the self.
Collectively, the aforementioned studies on ambivalence suggest that the presence
of ambivalence—even in response to relatively low-risk behaviors—leads to careful
information processing and that individuals with a high degree of ambivalence tend to be
particularly sensitive to negative information. Applied to the current investigation, these
findings suggest that, compared to individuals with less ambivalence, those with
conflicting perceptions of self-related risks and self-related or other-related benefits
concerning organ donation may be particularly sensitive to negative information about
becoming a donor (i.e., possible losses or risks to another).
Ambivalence will vary in degree depending on the extent of individuals'
coexisting perceptions of benefits and risks regarding organ donation. A high degree of
perceived benefits (regarding the self or the potential recipient) in combination with a
high level of perceived risk to the self should result in the greatest amount of
ambivalence on the issue of becoming an organ donor. To a much lesser extent, the
presence of high self-relevant risk and lower perceptions of benefits would also create
ambivalence, because the perceived benefits to others will probably be relatively high for
most individuals. Because it seems intuitively likely that individuals can acknowledge
the inherent benefits of organ donation to the recipient, current study presumes that
perceived benefits to others should be moderately high and not vary much between
participants. Hence, ambivalence regarding the decision to become an organ donor
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should be present primarily in individuals with a moderate to high amount of perceived
self-relevant risk. Individuals with high perceptions of benefits and low perceptions of
self-relevant risk may not have any ambivalence at all. After all, if the risks that they
perceive to themselves are insignificant or nonexistent, the benefits should greatly
outweigh the risks. Instead of having ambivalence on the issue, these participants would
likely be very interested in becoming an organ donor as a way of taking advantage of the
associated benefits. On the other hand, individuals with equally low levels of benefits
and risks would likely be indifferent on the matter. Even if individuals don't perceive a
high level of personal risk associated with becoming a donor, if they do not also have
moderately high expectations for benefits, then they may lack any incentive to participate
in the process.
Assuming the presence of ambivalence causes individuals to be more responsive
to possible losses (Broemer, 2002), it seems quite probable that the level of ambivalence
should moderate the effectiveness of the gain and loss framed articles. That is, because
the loss frame is more negative than the gain frame, it stands to reason that it should be
particularly effective for individuals who are highly ambivalent about their decision to
become an organ donor. In other words, individuals with both high self-relevant risk
perceptions and high benefit perceptions should be more willing to become an organ
donor in response to the loss frame as opposed to the gain frame. Thus, the discrepancy in
willingness to become an organ donor for individuals exposed to the gain or loss frame
should be greater for highly ambivalent individuals than for those with low ambivalence
on the issue. Accordingly, the following hypothesis was proposed:
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H4: The relative effectiveness the loss frame over the gain frame will be greater for
those with high levels of ambivalence than for those with low levels of ambivalence.
Notably, this prediction regarding the response of individuals with high versus
low ambivalence to gain and loss frames mirrors the prediction for individuals with high
and low risk as stated in H3. That is, the difference between the effectiveness of the loss
frame over the gain frame should be greater for high than for low risk individuals, and
greater for those with high versus those with low ambivalence. Both self-relevant risk
and ambivalence appear to play the same role in message frame processing. However, it
stands to reason that the role of ambivalence may actually be a function of risk. That is,
because high levels of ambivalence are produced by high self-relevant risk combined
with high self and other benefits, it is possible that the presence of the high self-relevant
risk may be entirely responsible for how highly ambivalent individuals process the gain
and loss frame. Essentially, the presence of high self-relevant risk may determine the
responses to the message frames, regardless of whether there is a high or low level of
perceived benefits to create conflict.
As already noted, Broemer (2002) found that the presence of ambivalence caused
individuals to become more receptive to negative information presented in a loss frame.
However, because he used a subjective measure of participants' reported level of
ambivalence, he was unable to examine the specific role that the positive and negative
components of their ambivalence played. Thus, it is at least possible that ambivalent
individuals' negativity bias was actually a result of their negative evaluations (e.g.,
perceived risks) associated with the recommended behavior, rather than their combined
positive and negative evaluations.
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As previously discussed, past research on organ donation behaviors has found that
negative perceptions of organ donation often outweigh the positive ones, even if the
positive perceptions are substantial. Parisi and Katz (1986) confirmed that even when
individuals had very positive beliefs about organ donation they were unlikely to become
organ donors if they also had negative beliefs. Similarly, Van den Berg et al. (2005)
found that the presence of negative emotions related to organ donation was enough to
restrict individuals' willingness to become a donor even if participants' positive emotions
toward the process were higher. These two studies seem to suggest that negative
evaluations of organ donation (i.e., self-relevant risks) alone would be enough to cause an
individual to opt not to become a donor, regardless of that person's level of ambivalence.
In other words, regardless of the level of perceived benefits (to either the self or the
recipient), the level of perceived risk to the self may be the determining factor in one's
decision to avoid organ donation. However, if this is the case, the prediction developed
in H4 would be misleading. Specifically, if risk is held constant, then the effect of
ambivalence on the relative effectiveness of the loss frame over the gain frame for highrisk individuals should disappear. This outcome would suggest that self-relevant risk
may be the key reason that the difference in effectiveness of the loss frame over the gain
frame is greater for individuals in the high ambivalence group (cf. Broemer, 2002).
However, if ambivalence does interact with the message frame (gain versus loss)
after controlling for self-relevant risk, this would suggest that the variations in
individuals' perceived self and other relevant benefits have an impact on the reception of
different message frames. Because self and other relevant benefits make up ambivalence
when paired with high levels of risk, accounting for the role of risk should highlight their
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unique role in the decision making process. Thus, overall, if there is an interaction
between ambivalence and message frame when risk is held constant, this would indicate
that ambivalence is a key factor in the relative effectiveness of the loss frame over the
gain frame for high and low risk individuals.
RQ1: After controlling for self-relevant risk, does ambivalence still account for the
relative effectiveness of the loss frame over the gain frame.
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Chapter 2
Method
Participants
One hundred and eighty one students were recruited from introductory
communication classes in a large urban university. Thirty of these individuals who
indicated they had already signed an organ donor card were excluded from the study as
were two participants who were over 40 years of age. No participants reported knowing
anyone with cystic fibrosis, nor did anyone indicate that they had any personal experience
with organ transplantation. Only ten participants who had not already signed an organ
donor card indicated that they had a friend or family member who had received an organ
transplant or currently have a friend or family member waiting for a transplant. These
individuals were included in the study. The final sample used for analysis consisted of
149 undergraduate students (96 female, 49 male; 4 did not report gender). The age of
participants ranged from 18 to 39 years (M = 22, SD = 3.95). Almost a third of
respondents (28.2%) identified themselves as Caucasian, 27.5% as African-Americans,
17.4% as Asian/Pacific Islander, 10.7% Hispanic, 9.4% multiracial, and 6.7% did not
report their race/ethnicity. Over 40 different academic majors were represented in this
sample.
Half of respondents (50.3%) indicated that they were registered as organ donors
on their drivers' license. Notably, of these individuals, only 41.3% reported that they
would "definitely" be willing to sign a donor card, and only 24% indicated that they
would "probably sign the card." Fully, 34.7% of participants currently registered as
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organ donors on their drivers' license reported that they were "unsure" about whether they
would be willing to sign a donor card or that they would "probably not" or "definitely
not" sign the card.
Research Design
The current experiment used a 2 x 2 factorial design with a manipulated news
article (gain vs. loss) as one factor. In some analyses, self-relevant risk perceptions (high
vs. low) was the second factor, and in others it was ambivalence (high vs. low).
Experimental Stimuli
Two versions of a news article were created for stimuli in this study (See
Appendix A). The articles focus on the story of a male college student, James, who
suffers from cystic fibrosis and progressive lung failure. The two articles are identical in
length and provide the same background information on James. The loss framed message
includes several sentences explaining that James will die if he does not receive a double
lung transplant (e.g., "Without the help of a pair donated lungs that James so desperately
needs, he will lose his chance to battle his impending lung failure and will most certainly
die."), and the gain framed message instead includes statements predicting James's
survival if he does receive the donated lungs (e.g., "However, if James receives the help
of a pair of donated lungs that he so desperately needs, he's expected to reverse his lung
failure and live a life of certain promise."). Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the two message conditions. To collect information on the variables of interest,
participants were asked to complete a questionnaire after reading the article.
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Procedure
The articles and questionnaires were administered at the beginning of the class
period. After reading and signing an informed consent form (See Appendix B),
participants were given oral instructions to read the article and then complete an attached
questionnaire. Reading the article and completing the questionnaire took participants
approximately 15-20 minutes. Data for this study was collected over approximately a
three week time period.
Measures
The questionnaire administered in this study includes measures of attitudes and
intentions regarding a personal commitment to becoming an organ donor, positive and
negative beliefs regarding organ donation, manipulation checks, demographics, and
experience with Cystic Fibrosis and organ donation. Additionally, the questionnaire
includes some measures of emotion and empathy that will be employed in future
analyses. The following sections contain brief descriptions of the measures relevant to
the current research. See Appendix C for a copy of the questionnaire.
Willingness to donate. Before participants were asked to indicate their intent to
sign the organ donation card, were asked whether or not they were registered as organ
donors on their driver's license. Intent to sign the card was measured on a 5-point scale
developed by Skumanich and Kintsfather (1996) (1 = "I will definitely sign the card," 2 =
"I will probably sign the card," 3 = "I am unsure as to whether or not I will sign it," 4 = I
will probably not sign it," and 5 = "I will definitely not sign it."). A sixth item was added
to identify the participants who had already signed an organ donation card and who were
later excluded from analysis: "I already have signed an organ donation card." The five
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remaining responses were reverse coded so that 5 indicated the greatest willingness to
donate and 1 indicated the least willingness to donate.
Risks and benefits. Benefits and risks to the self and benefits to others were
measured using items from the Organ Donation Attitude Scale (ODAS), developed by
Parisi and Katz (1986) and adapted by Kent and Owens (1995). The ODAS was
developed to examine both positive and negative beliefs related to volunteering to be a
posthumous organ donor. The scale consists of a total of 46 items; half of the statements
address prodonation beliefs and the other half focus on antidonation beliefs.
Twenty-two items from the scale will be included on the questionnaire for the
current study according to whether they address a risk to the self, a self-relevant benefit,
or benefit-relevant to another. Items with the highest factor loadings were selected for
each of these categories.
In a factor analysis of the scale, Boey (2002) determined that items on the
positive dimension of the scale corresponded to moral convictions (Factor I), while the
items on the negative scale either corresponded to either to fear of bodily mutilation
(Factor II) or fear of medical neglect (Factor III). To select items for the current study,
items on the first factor were categorized according to whether they appear to address a
self-relevant benefit (e.g., "vowing to donate organs at death makes one more respected
and admired by family and friends"), or a recipient-relevant benefit (e.g., "by donating an
organ at death, one can offer someone a better chance of being cured"). Two additional
items were selected because they loaded highly on the positive dimension of the ODAS,
even though they did not clearly fit into one of the benefit categories. Factors II and III
predominantly addressed concerns about organ donation related to bodily harm and
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medical neglect, respectively. Because almost all of the items on factors II and III
appeared to address some sort of self-relevant risk perception (e.g., "a person will be less
likely to receive adequate medical care after signing a donor card"), an equal number of
items were taken from each factor to measure risks. Based on Boey's analysis of the
factorial structure of the ODAS, the final items included in the subscale consisted of the
five items in each of the two benefit categories that had the highest factor loading, in
addition to the five items on both Factor II and III that had the highest factor loadings.
Subscale items are displayed in Appendix A.
After reading each belief statement in the scale, respondents were asked to rate
the extent of their agreement on a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 = disagree strongly; 6 =
agree strongly). Hence, higher scores on prodonation items indicate positive beliefs and
higher scores on negative items indicate higher negative beliefs. The scale does not
include a middle neutral point. The reliabilities for both of the created ODAS subscales
were high: self-relevant and other relevant benefits combined (α = .92) and risks (α =
.84). A median split of the combined scores on these items was used to determine the
high and low risk groups for the current study.
Ambivalence. Two different ambivalence scales were employed in the
questionnaire. Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 's (1995) "Griffin" measure of ambivalence
was used to determine participants' degree of ambivalence calculated by the following
formula: Ambivalence = (P + N)/2 - |P – N|, where for the current application of the
ODAS, P was be calculated from the benefit items while N was calculated from the risk
items. Based on the 6-point scale used for the positive and negative items, calculated
ambivalence scores can from -1.5 (no ambivalence) to 6 (maximum ambivalence). A
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median split was taken of participants' ambivalence scores to determine the high and low
ambivalence groups for the current study.
Additionally, as a validity check for the calculated ambivalence scores, the
questionnaire included three items that were modified from Priester and Petty's (1996)
Subjective Ambivalence Questionnaire as a way of measuring participants' evaluation of
their felt ambivalence. Participants were asked to indicate the degree that they feel
conflicted, indecisive, and mixed when considering the decision of whether or not to
become an organ donor. Semantic differential scales are used for each item with scores
that could vary from 1, the absence of the ambivalent reaction (e.g., "feel no conflict at
all"), to 7, the greatest amount of the ambivalent reaction (e.g., "feel maximum conflict").
This subscale was very reliable (α = .87) and also moderately correlated with the
ambivalence scores calculated using the Griffin measure, r = .49, p < .01.
Manipulation checks. To check the effectiveness of the gain and loss framing
manipulations, participants were asked to rate the tone of the article on a 7-point semantic
differential scale ranging from 1, "very negative", to 7, "very positive". A separate item
was also included that asks participants to rate the likelihood that James will survive, on a
scale of 1, "Very likely he will die", to 7, "Very likely he will live."
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Chapter 3
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Random assignment check. Two independent sample t-tests were conducted to
make sure that there were no risk and benefit perception differences between the two
message frame conditions. These tests confirmed that the gain nor loss frame did not
differ for risks (p > .81) or benefits (p > .82).
Manipulation checks. Independent sample t-tests confirmed that the
manipulations were effective. Participants exposed to the gain frame evaluated the tone
of the article as being significantly more positive (M = 4.67) than those exposed to the
loss frame (M = 4.15), t(141) = -2.28, p < .05. Participants exposed to the gain frame
also estimated the likelihood that James will survive as being significantly greater (M =
4.14) than participants exposed to the loss frame (M = 3.35), t(141) = -3.03, p < .01.
Descriptive statistics. The means, standard deviations, and correlations for the
variables can be found in Table 1. Perceived benefits were negatively correlated with
self-relevant risk and calculated ambivalence, and positively correlated with willingness
to donate. Risk was negatively correlated with willingness to donate, and positively
correlated with subjective ambivalence and calculated ambivalence. Both calculated
ambivalence and subjective ambivalence were negatively correlated with willingness to
donate. The two measures of ambivalence were positively correlated.
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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations Between Variables

Measure

Mean

SD

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Frame

--

--

.09

.02

-.02

.14

.02

-.08

2. Gender

--

--

--

.06

.12

.08

.13

-.03

3. Risk

2.80

.93

--

--

-.38**

.87**

.43**

-.45**

4. Benefits

4.43

.93

--

--

--

-.35**

-.04

.52**

5. Calculated
Ambivalence

1.71

1.34

--

--

--

--

.50**

-.44**

6. Subjective
Ambivalence

2.97

1.68

--

--

--

--

--

-.22*

7. Willingness
to Donate

3.16

1.36

--

--

--

--

--

--

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Note. The range of possible scores was: risk and benefits, 1 to 6; calculated ambivalence, -1.5 to
6; subjective ambivalence, 1 to 7; and willingness to donate, 1 to 5.

Framing and Risk
A 2 x 2 (message frame x risk level) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was
performed to address H1, H2, and H3. H1 predicted that participants exposed to the loss
frame would be more likely to sign an organ donation card than those exposed to the gain
frame. However, this analysis did not reveal a main effect for message frame, F(1, 145)
= 1.44, p = .23. Hence, H1 was not supported. However, as predicted in H2, a there was
a significant main effect of risk, F(1, 145) = 25.31, p < .001, eta2 = .15. Individuals in
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the low risk group (M = 3.69) group were more willing than individuals in the high risk
group (M = 2.63) to become organ donors. H3 was not supported. Risk-level did not
interact with message frame, F(1, 145) = .21, p = .65.
Framing and Ambivalence
Because the ambivalence measure developed using the Griffin formula used
positive and negative ODAS items, the ambivalence values calculated with this method
may have overlapped with the risk scores used in the formula. To avoid this problem
with the calculated scores, the Subjective Ambivalence scale of felt ambivalence was
used for the analysis instead. A median split divided the scores from this scale into high
and low ambivalence.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that ambivalence level would moderate the relative
effectiveness of the loss frame over the gain frame at increasing compliance with
becoming an organ donor. An additional 2 x 2 (message frame x ambivalence level)
ANOVA was performed to explore this hypothesis. A main effect of ambivalence
emerged F(1,145) = 6.96, p < .05, eta2 = .05, such that individuals in the low ambivalence
group (M=3.48) expressed more willingness to become an organ donor than those in the
high ambivalence group (M=2.89). However, the predicted interaction was not
significant F(1, 145) =.308, p =.58.
Framing and Ambivalence with Risk as a Covariate
Finally, a 2 x 2 (message frame x ambivalence level) ANCOVA was run with risk
level as a covariate to answer RQ1, which addressed whether ambivalence or perceived
risk is the key factor in the relative effectiveness of the loss frame over the gain frame.
For this analysis, instead of using the dichotomous variable for high and low risk, the
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continuous scale risk variable was used. The only significant main effect that remained in
this analysis was the covariate, risk level F(1, 144) = 28.64, p < .001, eta2 = .17. There
was no significant main effect for ambivalence level, F(1, 144) =.09, p = .76, or message
frame, F(1, 144) =.81, p = .37. Furthermore, there was no interaction between message
frame and ambivalence level F(1, 144) =.36, p = .58.
Originally, RQ1 was posed to examine whether ambivalence alone could sustain
the interaction between message frame and risk level. However, no such interaction was
confirmed. Nonetheless, because the results of this analysis indicate that ambivalence
level is not a significant predictor of respondents' willingness to sign a donor card when
the risk is controlled, they suggest that risk level—not ambivalence—is the deciding
factor in people's decision of whether or not to become an organ donor. To further
examine this possibility, a second 2 x 2 (message frame x risk level) ANCOVA was
performed, and this time the continuous variable of subjective ambivalence level was
used as a covariate. With ambivalence held constant, the main effect for risk level
emerged once again, F(1,144) = 20.26, p < .001, eta2 = .12. No other significant main
effects or interactions were found.
Supplemental Analyses
As an alternative way to explore the predicted interaction between message frame
and risk as stated in H3, the dependent variable, willingness to sign an organ donor card,
was recoded into a dichotomous variable that grouped the "definitely will sign," and
"probably will sign" responses into one "willing to donate" category, and the "definitely
will not sign," "probably will not sign," and "unsure whether or not I will sign" responses
into an "unwilling to donate" category. Using this recoded variable, chi-square analyses
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were performed to investigate the relationship between the two message frames and the
high and low risk levels. The first analysis showed that for high-risk participants,
willingness to donate did not differ by frame, χ2(1) = 0.22, p = .88 (loss frame, 23.7%;
gain frame, 22.2%). However, the second analysis revealed that for low-risk participants,
willingness to donate did differ by frame, χ2(1) = 4.15, p < .05. Specifically, low risk
participants exposed to the loss frame were more willing to donate (69.4%) than those
exposed to the gain frame (46.2%). Thus, it appears that exposure to the loss frame
increased willingness to become an organ donor among low-risk individuals. A visual
representation of these results can be found in Figure 2.

Percent of Respondents Willing to
Become an Organ Donor
80
High Risk
Low Risk

60

40

20

0
Gain Frame

Loss Frame

Figure 2

Hypothesis 1 predicted that the loss frame would increase participants'
willingness to become organ donors regardless of whether they had high or low levels of
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perceived risk. The rationale behind this hypothesis was that the narrative in the loss
frame should provide more incentive for individuals to engage in what could be
perceived as a risky behavior (i.e., becoming an organ donor). However, the
aforementioned analysis only supports this prediction for low-risk individuals, suggesting
that they may be more responsive to the severity of the situation for the person waiting to
receive an organ. One explanation for the differential effect of the two frames on these
low risk individuals is that the loss frame had a greater effect than the gain frame on
perception of benefits that are associated with becoming an organ donor. To explore the
possible role that benefit perceptions played in the results found with the Chi-square
analyses, an additional 2 x 2 (message frame x risk level) ANOVA was conducted to
examine the differences in benefit perceptions. From this analysis, a main effect emerged
for risk, F(1, 145) = 20.53, p < .001, eta2 = .12, but not for message frame, F(1, 145) =
.15, p = .70. More importantly, the interaction between message frame and risk level was
significant, F(1, 145) = 5.61, p < .05, eta2 = .04. The means showed that the benefit
perceptions for low risk participants exposed to the loss frame (M = 5.04) were slightly
higher than those exposed to the gain frame (M = 4.65), whereas the benefit perceptions
for high risk participants exposed to the loss frame (M = 3.87) were slightly lower than
for those exposed to the gain frame (M = 4.16). Thus, it appears that the two frames had
opposite effects for low and high risk individuals. Specifically, benefit perceptions were
higher for low risk participants exposed to the loss frame than those exposed to the gain
frame, but for high risk participants they were lower for those exposed to the loss frame
compared to those exposed to the gain frame. However, Tukey comparisons did not
reveal any significant differences between individual means.
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Chapter 4
Discussion
Framing and Risk
One of the primary objectives of this study was to identify some of the factors that
contribute to the different effects of gain and loss framed messages about organ donation.
Yet, one of the most surprising results from this study was that the gain and the loss
framed message did not differ in effectiveness. This study predicted that, in line with
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and
Rothman and Salovey's (1997) application of the theory to health decision-making, the
loss frame would be more effective than the gain frame in encouraging participants to
become an organ donor because volunteering as a donor may be considered a risk-laden
behavior, similar to a health screening. However, the frame emphasizing the possible
death of an organ recipient should he not receive a transplant and the frame emphasizing
his likely survival in the event that he receives the transplant appear to have elicited the
same responses regarding signing an organ donation card. Hence, the hypothesis was not
supported.
As expected, low risk individuals expressed more willingness to become organ
donors than those with higher self-perceived risks. Yet, another surprising finding was
that risk did not moderate message frame processing in the predicted direction. Rothman
and Salovey (1997), argued that loss framed messages should be effective to the extent
that individuals perceive the recommended behavior to involve risk. Accordingly, this
paper predicted that the loss frame would be particularly effective for those with high
risk. However, when willingness to become an organ donor was measured on a scale,
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there was no difference in either frames effectiveness for high and low risk individuals.
Only when willingness to sign a donor card was split into two "likely to donate" and
"unlikely to donate" categories, an interaction pattern, different from the one predicted,
emerged: low risk individuals were more greatly affected by the loss framed message
than the gain frame. There was no difference in how individuals with high risk
perceptions responded to the gain and loss frames.
Both of the aforementioned results for message framing effects are inconsistent
with Rothman and Salovey's (1997) predictions for frames involving risk-laden screening
recommendations. However, one possible explanation for these findings is that
becoming an organ donor, although considered a risky option for some, does not function
the same way as risk-involving screening behaviors. Research on health message framing
has been somewhat limited to behavioral decisions that involve a similar type of risk
related to the possibility of detecting personal health problems (Rothman, Bartels,
Wlaschin, & Salovey, 2006). Yet, as previously discussed, becoming an organ donor is a
unique type of health decision because, unlike other decisions that require an individual
to weigh the risks to themselves if they adopt the recommended behavior vs. risks to
themselves if they chose not to adopt it, organ donation requires individuals to weigh the
risks to themselves if they become a donor against the risks (or benefits) to an
anonymous other if they do not (Parisi & Katz, 1986). Hence, although prospect theory
has yielded consistent results in respect to decisions made on behalf of others or decisions
made on behalf of the self (O'Keefe & Jensen, 2006), the influence of message framing
on decision making appears to operate differently in the more complex context of organ
donation that involves competing priorities.
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An important difference between the organ donation messages in the current
study and messages that are designed to persuade individuals to engage in health
screening or prevention behaviors is how the recommended behavior and potential
consequences are directed. In the case of health screening or prevention behavior
messages, the recommended behavior and the potential consequences of adopting or not
adopting it are usually directed at the self. That is, these messages address the probability
that a positive or negative outcome will occur to the individual making the decision of
whether or not to accept the behavioral recommendation (Rothman & Salovey, 1997;
Rothman, et al., 2003). However, in the case of organ donation messages, the
recommended behavior is directed at the self while the potential consequences are
directed at another. Put simply, the organ donation message does not directly address any
personal benefits or repercussions, and instead these appeals address the probability that a
positive or negative outcome will occur to another. If these negative and positive
consequences are at all responsible for framing effects, then perhaps the gain and loss
frames were equally effective because no personal outcomes were varied.
Another important difference between organ donation messages and messages
designed to promote health screening behaviors is that the former tends to emphasize the
benefits of a recommended behavior for another. This difference may account for the
unexpected finding that the loss frame was more effective for low risk participants, but
not for high risk participants. In line with Baston's (1987) empathy-altruism hypothesis, a
heightened understanding of another person's suffering may be a very effective way of
encouraging participants to engage in organ donation, but perhaps this is only true if
donors have little or no perceptions of personal risk. Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas,
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and Isen (1983) discovered helping behaviors that pose a high cost can distract
individuals—even those that report high levels of empathy—from their concern for
another. Thus, with greater concerns about their own personal safety, high risk
participants may have been too absorbed in their own personal concern to be influenced
by either the gain or loss frame's presentation of the organ recipient's predicament.
However, because the low risk participants lacked high levels of negative sentiment
towards becoming an organ donor, it stands to reason that they may have been more
attune to the distress of the potential organ recipient in the messages. Consistent with
prospect theory, it was predicted that the loss frame should encourage individuals to be
more willing to engage in a risky behavior on recipient's behalf because it highlights the
potential organ recipient's likely death (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981). Yet, Batson et al.'s (1983) findings give some credence to the
possibility that only low risk individuals were more receptive to the needs of the potential
recipient (i.e., the benefits of becoming a donor) because they were less distracted by
self-perceived risk. Hence, because the benefits of organ donation for the recipient are
framed as being higher in the loss frame, perceived benefits should be higher for low risk
individuals exposed to the loss frame than those exposed to the gain frame.
This conclusion is supported by the results of the supplemental ANOVA which
showed an interaction pattern for benefit perceptions. In fact, in this analysis the effects
for the two frames were reversed: the low risk participants exposed to the loss frame had
higher levels of perceived benefits than those exposed to the gain frame while the low
risk participants exposed to the loss frame had lower perceived benefits than those
exposed to the gain frame. In light of the finding that the loss frame was effective among

41

low risk participants but not for high risk participants, this pattern suggests that higher
levels of perceived benefits associated with the loss frame could be responsible for this
effect.
Of course, if perceived benefits were manipulated by the message frames, then it
seems possible that perceived risks were manipulated as well. However, this possibility
seems unlikely because the subject matter of the messages only addressed the dangers of
a potential transplant recipient not obtaining the organs he needs or the benefits to him
should he receive the organs. Participants' personal risk involved with becoming an
organ donor was not addressed at all in the messages; only risks to the recipient (i.e.,
death, unless he receives an organ donation) were manipulated. Thus, participants'
preexisting perceptions of risk associated with becoming an organ donor was probably
unaffected by exposure to the messages.
Risk and Ambivalence
Another important finding of this study was the prominent role of risk over
ambivalence as a determinant of intentions to become—or rather not become an organ
donor. The finding that high risk is associated with lower compliance with card signing
behavior suggests that the decision of whether or not to become an organ donor is
dependent on whether or not the person perceives personal threats associated with the
process. One of the major findings of this research is that although ambivalence was
initially shown to be associated with participants' card signing intentions, when risk was
held constant, this effect disappeared. Thus, risk appears to explain participants' card
signing intentions better than conflicting benefit and risk perceptions. Of course,
whether these results are unique to the decision process behind becoming an organ donor
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has yet to be determined. These results shed light on the role of ambivalence in organ
donor behaviors and lend further support for research that suggests that the presence of
negative evaluations regarding organ donation is enough to inhibit a person's willingness
to become a donor, even if benefit perceptions are simultaneously high (Cacioppo &
Gardner, 1993; Parisi & Katz, 1986; Van den Berg et al, 2005). The influence of risk, it
seems, overshadows any influence of benefits associated with becoming and organ donor.
As an extension of the previous discussion, these results also support the notion
that unlike low-risk individuals, high-risk individuals tend to be resistant to becoming a
donor regardless of whether they are exposed to the loss frame that emphasizes higher
benefits associated with the process or the gain frame. In fact, it is interesting to note that
high-risk individuals exposed to the loss frame actually had lower perceptions of benefits
than those exposed to the gain frame. Although the differences were not significant, this
pattern suggests high-risk participants may have a tendency to actually deemphasize the
suffering of another, perhaps as a way to reduce their own feelings guilt or empathetic
distress associated with not becoming a donor and rationalize their decision (Burgoon,
Alvaro, Grandpre, & Voulodakis, 2002; Shaw, Batson, & Todd, 1994).
As a final point, although ambivalence did not mediate the effects of message
frame in the current study, these findings do not necessarily contradict prior research
findings that suggest the opposite. Failure to find any effects of ambivalence on message
response may be due to the unique high-risk context surrounding organ donation.
Ambivalence may cause individuals to more thoroughly scrutinize information related to
hiring decisions (MacDonald & Zanna, 1998) or healthy life style choices (Broemer,
2002). However compared to the personal risks often associated with organ donation
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(e.g., being put to death prematurely), the personal risks associated with these decisions
are relatively low. Thus, the role of ambivalence in message processing may be directly
related to the degree of risk that is associated with the recommended behavior. However,
more research is needed to confirm this possibility.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
This study has several limitations. Half of the sample used for this study had
already indicated their wishes to be an organ donor on their state driver's license. Of
course, it bears mention that many of the participants who were registered donors on their
license nonetheless reported that they were not willing to sign an organ donor card.
Unfortunately, no reasons for this seeming contradiction were investigated. This issue
calls attention to the importance of examining preexisting attitudes toward organ
donation which may or may not be subject to change. Prior thought and intent has been
shown to influence cognitive and affective responses to persuasive appeals on organ
donation, and individuals with strong preconceived notions about particular issues may
be resistant to messages that conflict with their preformed opinions (Kopfman et al.,1998;
Rothman & Salovey, 1997). To help conceal the research objectives from participants in
this study, no pre-tests were administered, so there was no way to determine whether the
attitudes respondents expressed following exposure to the message frames had changed.
Likewise, because no control group was included in this design (cf. Cox & Cox, 2001;
Hoffner & Ye, in press), it is not possible to confirm for certain that the messages were
effective at persuading participants to become organ donors.
A significant constraint to the validity of the dependent variable in the current
research is that it measured intentions to become an organ donor rather than actual
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behaviors (Radecki & Jaccard, 1999). Future research on framing and organ donation
should include behavioral measures of responses to message framing, including the
documentation of actual card signing behaviors. Recently, researchers have begun to
emphasize the utility of donors' willingness to communicate their wishes with their
family who are ultimately responsible for carrying out their request (Afifi et al., 2006;
Morgan, 2004; Morgan & Miller, 2001). The behavioral outcomes of framing in
messages designed to encourage positive family communication regarding donation
would be a fruitful and useful line of research.
Additional research is also needed to investigate the effects of different types of
message frames related to organ donation. The current research employed gain- and lossframed messages on organ donation presented in terms of the potential for a life saved or
a life lost. Consequently, the information conveyed in these messages was limited to
potential benefits to the organ recipient prior to receiving or being denied a transplant.
However, many messages that the public is exposed to on organ donation focus on issues
related to a posttransplantation success or the tragic death of individuals who did not
receive transplants (Feeley & Donald, 2007). Hence, more research is needed on the
relative effectiveness of gain and loss frames that address the benefits or risks to
recipients based on past situations. Furthermore, this study's findings on the inhibiting
effects of perceived risk underscores the need for persuasive organ donation appeals to
reduce negative misperceptions about the process. Some studies have found that appeals
that include counterarguments to misconceptions are effective at promoting donation
(Ford & Smith, 1991; Winkle, 1984). Nonetheless, because these refutations have the
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potential to actually increase perceptions of risk, their inclusion in messages should be
approached with caution (Smith, Morrison, Kopfman, & Ford, 1994).
This study also presents evidence that benefit perceptions may play an important
role in persuading low-risk individuals to become organ donors. As previously
discussed, less than half of the individuals in the current investigation that had registered
as organ donors on their state driver's license reported that they would definitely be
willing to sign an organ donor card. Hence, although low-risk participants may be more
willing to become donors than high-risk individuals, this does not mean that low-risk
individuals will certainly become organ donors. Many low-risk individuals may be
indifferent on the issue of organ donation, and many of them may still need to be
persuaded to take the initiative to actually commit to the process. However, more
research is needed to determine the type of benefit perceptions that are the most
appealing. Future analysis will need to examine whether these individuals have more
incentive to donate because of self-relevant benefits as proposed by Cialdini, Darby, and
Vincent's (1973) Negative State Relief Model, or other-relevant benefits as suggested by
Batson's (1987) Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis. There is some research to suggest that
the effectiveness of different types of egoistic and altruistic appeals may vary according
to individual differences such as gender (Brunel & Nelson, 2000).
Moreover, the current investigation included messages that manipulated benefits
to a potential organ recipient in the event that he receives a transplant, but no messages
were included that specifically addressed direct benefits for the donor. More research is
needed to determine the effects of gain framed messages that emphasize personal
incentives to become an organ donor such as making a friend or family member proud,
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feeling good about one's self, or even emulating the behavior of an admired role model,
versus loss-framed messages that focus on the possibility of disappointing someone or
feeling guilty for not becoming a donor.
Finally, it is unclear how participants in this study responded to the main
character of the experimental messages, but these reactions may help shed some light on
some of the present findings. Either because of demographic differences or difficulty
identifying with the possibility of suffering from a rare genetic disease, many participants
in the current study may have felt far removed from to the young adult male suffering
from Cystic Fibrosis that was the focus on the experimental messages. Recent research
indicates that feelings of similarity to the main character in a health message can
moderate the effectiveness of gain and loss message frames (Hoffner & Ye, in press).
Furthermore, the current research did not include a measure of participants' level of issue
involvement, but this variable has been shown to be an important predictor of message
processing strategies and may moderate the effects of different frames of organ donation
messages (Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981).
Hence, it is important to make sure that participants believe that the issue of organ
donation does or could potentially be significant for their own lives. Perhaps the
inclusion of a college student suffering from a disease that participants themselves are
more likely to acquire (e.g., diabetes) could improve their feelings of similarity and issue
involvement.
Conclusion
The present study demonstrated that, rather than ambivalence, perceptions of selfrelevant risk associated with the prospect of becoming an organ donor tend to be the
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deciding factor in individuals' decisions about whether to sign an organ donor card. No
main effects for framing were discovered, perhaps because of the unique context this
decision, involving a cost-benefit analysis of risks to the self and needs of potential organ
recipients, situates it outside the realm of traditional health screening and prevention
behaviors. In their recent review of the literature on loss- and gain-framed appeals,
Rothman et al. (2006) point out that this line of research has been based on a very limited
range of health behaviors. The unique circumstances surrounding organ donation may
pose new challenges to the current understanding the effect that message framing has on
altruistic and health-related behaviors.
Finally, this research did find that the loss frame was a moderately effective
persuasive device for low-risk individuals, possibly because it increased the benefits they
associate with the process of organ donation. Yet, high-risk individuals may have
actively resisted the same effect. Although, diffusing high-risk individuals' negative
perceptions about organ donation remains a worthy goal, mixed findings on the success
of such efforts suggests they have the potential to do more harm than good by creating or
reinforcing fears about organ donation (Smith et al., 1994). An interesting finding of the
current study is that individuals who are not necessarily unwilling to donate may still lack
the motivation to commit as organ donors. Thus, rather than focusing on changing the
perceptions of high-risk individuals, research on organ donation would benefit from
paying more attention to encouraging low-risk individuals to become donors.
Accordingly, future studies should further examine message framing responses, benefit
perceptions, and motivations to become organ donors among low-risk participants who
are likely the most receptive candidates for organ donation.
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Organ Donation Attitude Scale Subscale Items
Benefits to Self
Add extra meaning to life
Endow death meaning
Respected and admired by family and friends
Set a good example
Feel proud of myself
Benefits to Others
Giving people hope of survival
Keep other living
Offer chance for being cured
Benefit humanity
Lives were saved
Misc. Benefit Items
Making a precious gift
A moral act
Risks to Self
Uneasy about body being cut up
Feel uncomfortable
Die with whole body
Buried with original parts
Body disfigured
Less likely to receive medical care
Prematurely declare death
Pronounce death even when alive
Appropriate medical technique not used
Intact body needed
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Below is a copy of an article on a health issue. Please read this article carefully
before proceeding to the questionnaire.
"Prospective Transplant Recipient Awaits Death"
Ask James Hall about the one thing he wants most in this world and, without
missing a beat, he will tell you that he merely wants to attend his college graduation.
Which isn't really asking much considering the 22-year-old aspiring neuroscientist just
completed a double major in biology and psychology with a high grade point average.
But to walk with his class and receive his diploma, he's got to stay alive. And that's where
things get complicated.
For James, even normal activities are hard to accomplish these days. James
suffers from cystic fibrosis and is one of nearly 3,000 patients in the U.S. who need a
lung transplant—in his case, a double lung transplant.
Unfortunately, if James doesn't receive the new lungs that he needs, his
chances of survival are poor. Recent statistics indicate that, in addition to
experiencing a decline in their quality of life, patients with cystic fibrosis who do not
receive a lung transplant have a decreased rate of survival.
Currently, James is functioning with a lung capacity of just 26 percent, and he
recently became dependent on a breathing support machine to help him get the oxygen he
needs. Until very recently, James was on his university campus regularly but because he
needed to devote more time to doctor-prescribed breathing exercises, he was forced to
complete his coursework from his home. But school work is hard to focus on these
days, and given the circumstances James feels anxious and concerned about the
future.
"I'm worried that my fate is unavoidable," he says solemnly. "I'm constantly
worried that my next breath will be my last. It's not easy waiting for new lungs
which may never come."
Many people with cystic fibrosis die younger than he is now, but he's almost
made it far enough to don his cap and gown. Almost. Right now, James and his family
are praying for a miracle.
Doctors say that without the help of a pair donated lungs that James so
desperately needs, he will lose his chance to battle with impending lung failure and
will most certainly die. Because of the shortage of available organs in the United States,
James' fate is uncertain. And so he waits. And waits. Graduation is approaching quickly.
He can only hope he'll get to walk down that aisle with his class.
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Below is a copy of an article on a health issue. Please read this article carefully
before proceeding to the questionnaire.
"Prospective Transplant Recipient Looks Forward to Life"
Ask James Hall about the one thing he wants most in this world and, without
missing a beat, he will tell you that he merely wants to attend his college graduation.
Which isn't really asking much considering the 22-year-old aspiring neuroscientist just
completed a double major in biology and psychology with a high grade point average.
But to walk with his class and receive his diploma, he's got to stay alive. And that's where
things get complicated.
For James, even normal activities are hard to accomplish these days. James
suffers from cystic fibrosis and is one of nearly 3,000 patients in the U.S. who need a
lung transplant—in his case, a double lung transplant.
Fortunately, if James obtains the new lungs that he needs, the odds that his
health will improve are remarkably good. Recent statistics indicate that, in addition
to increasing the quality of life for patients with cystic fibrosis, lung transplantation
dramatically increases their overall survival rate.
Currently, James is functioning with a lung capacity of just 26 percent, and he
recently became dependent on a breathing support machine to help him get the oxygen he
needs. Until very recently, James was on his university campus regularly but because he
needed to devote more time to doctor-prescribed breathing exercises, he was forced to
complete his coursework from his home. Yet despite his hardships, James feels lucky
to be alive and hopeful about the future.
"This is just a temporary set back," he says optimistically. "It's not fun being
on the waiting list for new lungs, but the pay off is life so I think it's definitely worth
the wait."
Many people with cystic fibrosis die younger than he is now, but so far he's
almost made it far enough to don his cap and gown. Almost. Right now, James and his
family are praying for a miracle.
Doctors say that if James receives the help of a pair of donated lungs that he
so desperately needs, he's expected to reverse his lung failure and live a life of
certain promise. Because of the shortage of available organs in the United States,
James' fate is uncertain. And so he waits. And waits. Graduation is approaching quickly.
He can only hope he'll get to walk down that aisle with his class.
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Georgia State University
Department of Communication
Informed Consent Form
Title: Coverage of Health Issues
Principal Investigator: Cynthia Hoffner
Student Principal Investigator: Elizabeth Cohen
I. Purpose: You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to
assess college students’ reactions to an article about an important health issue (it varies): skin
cancer, organ donation, or nutrition. A total of 200 participants will be recruited for this study
from Georgia State University. Participation will require 15-20 minutes of your time.
II. Procedures: If you decide to participate, you will be asked to read a short article and
then complete a questionnaire that asks you about your opinions and responses. You will
not receive any compensation for your participation.
III. Risks: In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal life.
IV. Benefits: Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to gain
information to help us to better understand the nature of people’s responses to messages about
health issues. Your contribution would help us reach this understanding.
V. Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: Participation in research is voluntary. If you
decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You
may skip questions or stop participating at any time. Whatever you decide, you will not lose any
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
VI. Confidentiality: We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. We will use
a study number. Your name will not be on any study records. Only the principal investigators of
this study will have access to the information you provide. It will be stored in a private-use file
cabinet. Your name and other facts that might point to you will not appear when we present this
study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized and reported in group form. You
will not be identified personally.
VII. Contact Persons: If you have any questions about this study, please call Dr. Cynthia Hoffner
by phone at 404-651-3200 or by email joucah@langate.gsu.edu, or Elizabeth Cohen by phone at
404-651-3633 or by email jouelc@langate.gsu.edu. If you have questions or concerns about your
rights as a participant in this research study, you may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of
Research Integrity at 404-463-0674 or svogtner1@gsu.edu.

If you are willing to volunteer for this research, please sign below.
__________________________________________________________________________
Printed Name of Participant
Signature of Participant
Date
__________________________________________________________________________
Signature of Researcher Obtaining Consent
Date
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First, we have some questions about your current emotional state. Please read the
questions below and indicate whether or not you are experiencing a particular emotion
right now, at this very moment by checking either yes or no next to the corresponding
question. If you check yes to any one of the questions, please indicate the extent that you
are experiencing the emotion using the 7 – point scale (1 = slightly, 4 = moderately, and 7 =
extremely).
1. Do you feel happy? ___Yes ___No
If you checked yes, how happy do you feel?
Slightly
1

2

3

Moderately
4

5

6

Extremely
7

Moderately
4

5

6

Extremely
7

Moderately
4

5

6

Extremely
7

Moderately
4

5

6

Extremely
7

Moderately
4

5

6

Extremely
7

Moderately
4

5

6

Extremely
7

2. Do you feel guilty? ___Yes ___No
If you checked yes, how guilty do you feel?
Slightly
1

2

3

3. Do you feel bittersweet? ___Yes ___No
If you checked yes, how bittersweet do you feel?
Slightly
1

2

3

4. Do you feel proud? ___Yes ___No
If you checked yes, how proud do you feel?
Slightly
1

2

3

5. Do you feel sad? ___Yes ___No
If you checked yes, how sad do you feel?
Slightly
1

2

3

6. Do you feel afraid? ___Yes ___No
If you checked yes, how afraid do you feel?
Slightly
1

2

3
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7. Do you feel hopeful? ___Yes ___No
If you checked yes, how hopeful are you?
Slightly
1

2

3

Moderately
4

6

Extremely
7

5

6

Extremely
7

5

6

Extremely
7

5

Next, please tell us what you thought of the article that you just read:
8. How entertaining did you find the article?
Slightly
1

2

3

Moderately
4

9. How well-written do you think the article was?
Slightly
1

2

3

Moderately
4

Some states allow individuals to register as an organ donor by indicating their wishes on
their driver's license.
10. Are you currently registered as an organ donor on your driver's license? ___yes ___no
When you complete this questionnaire you will have the opportunity to take an
organ donation card. If you would like, you can take this card and have family members or
close friend witness your signature. By signing this card you acknowledge that you wish to
be an organ donor. Even if you have already registered as an organ donor on your drivers
license, this card will serve as an additional testament of your wishes to donate.
11. Please answer the following questions regarding your intentions to sign the card by putting an
X next to the statement that you feel best describes you.

___ I will definitely sign the card.
___ I will probably sign the card.
___ I am unsure as to whether or not I will sign it.
___ I will probably not sign it.
___ I will definitely not sign it.
___ I already have signed an organ donation card.
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Now, please consider how you personally feel about becoming an organ donor or not
becoming an organ donor. With respect to this decision, please use the following scales to
indicate your thoughts.
12. How much indecision do you feel when you think about becoming an organ donor?
Feel No
Indecision At
All

1

2

3

4

5

6

Feel
Maximum
Indecision

7

13. How conflicted do you feel when you think about becoming and organ donor?
Feel No
Conflict At
All

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Feel
Maximum
Conflict

7

Completely
Mixed
Reaction

14. When considering becoming an organ donor, how mixed is your reaction?
Completely
One-Sided
Reaction

1

2

3

4

5

6

Below are statements of beliefs about organ donation. Please read each one and decide the
extent to which you agree or disagree. There are no right or wrong answers; please indicate
the strength of your feelings by circling one of the following for each statement (1=disagree
strongly; 6 = agree strongly):
15. My family wants me to be an organ donor.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

16. Organ donation leaves the body disfigured.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

17. An intact body is needed for the next life.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

18. By agreeing to donate organs at death, one sets a good example for others to follow.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

19. Deciding to donate one's organs at death adds extra meaning to life
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly
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20. Other members of my family would object to me signing an organ donor card.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

21. Organ donation endows death with more meaning and worth.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

22. Vowing to donate organs at death is a highly moral act.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

23. Vowing to donate organs at death makes one more respected and admired by family and
friends.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

24. Extraordinary medical techniques will not be used to save the life of someone who has signed
a donor card.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

25. A person will be less likely to receive adequate medical care after signing a donor card.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

26. There is a good chance that doctors will be more likely to prematurely declare the death of a
person who has signed a donor card.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

27. Hearing about people whose lives were saved after the receipt of an organ makes me
think about the importance of donating my organs after death.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

28. The person who offers a part of his or her body for transplantation is making a really
precious gift.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly
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29. By agreeing to donate my organs after death, I am giving some people hope for survival.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

30. Promising to donate my organs upon my death makes me feel uncomfortable.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

31. Organ donation benefits the whole of humanity.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

32. When I die I want the whole of my body to die with me.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

33. A person who intends to donate their body parts at death increases the likelihood that one will
be pronounced dead even though one is still alive.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

34. By donating a body part after my death, I could keep another person living.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

35. The thought of my body being cut up or taken apart after I'm gone makes me feel uneasy.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

36. By donating an organ at death, one can offer someone a better chance of being cured.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

37. Donating an organ after my death would make me feel proud of myself.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

38. When I die I want to be buried whole and with all my original parts.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly
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39. My family would support me signing an organ donor card.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

5
Agree

6
Agree Strongly

40. The shortage of donated organs in this country is a serious problem.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Disagree Slightly

4
Agree Slightly

41. Please estimate the percent of people on the national waiting list for an organ transplant
that you think will receive the organs they need. There is no right or wrong answer, just
circle your best estimate.
10% or
less

11-20%

21-30%

31-40%

41-50%

51-60%

61-70%

71-80%

81-90%

91-100%

Now we'd like to find out a little more about you. Please indicate the extent to which you
agree or disagree that each of the statements below is true of you, by circling a number
between 1, disagree strongly, and 5 agree strongly.
42. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's point of view.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

43. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

44. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

45. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

46. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their
perspective.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

47. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree
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48. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's
arguments.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

49. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

50. I am often quite touched by things I see happen.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

51. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

52. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

53. When I am upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
1
Strongly Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

54. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would fee if I were in their place.
1
Disagree Strongly

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Agree Strongly

Next, please answer a couple of questions about the article you just read.
55. Using the scale below, please indicate how positive or negative you felt that the tone of the
article was.
Very Negative

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very Positive

56. Using the scale below, indicate how likely you think it is that James will survive.
Very Likely
He Will Die

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very Likely
He Will Live
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Finally, please answer just a few more questions about yourself.

57. Are you male or female?

___Male ___Female

59. How old are you? _____years old
60. What is your major? ____________________________
61. With what race/ethnicity do you identify?
___Asian/Pacific Islander

___Hispanic/Latino(a)

___White/Caucasian

___Black/African American

___Native American

___Other:__________________

62. Have you been diagnosed with Cystic Fibrosis? ___yes ___no
63. Have any of your family members or close friends ever been diagnosed with Cystic Fibrosis?
___yes ___no
64. Have you ever been on the waiting list to receive an organ transplant?
___yes ___no
65. Have you ever received an organ transplant?
___yes ___no
66. Have any of your family members or close friends ever received an organ transplant?
___yes ___no
67. Are any of your family members or close friends on a waiting list to receive an organ
transplant?
___yes ___no
68. Finally, is there anything else about organ donation that you would like to tell us?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Thank You!

